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Abstract 
To the modern law enforcement investigator, the potential for an offender to have a mobile device on his or her 
person, who connects to a Wi-Fi network, may afford evidence to place them at a scene, at a particular time. 
Whilst tools to interrogate mobile devices and Wi-Fi networks, have undergone significant development, little 
research has been conducted with regards to interrogating Wi-Fi routers and the evidence they may contain. 
This paper demonstrates that multiple inhibiting factors exist for forensic investigators when attempting to 
extract data from Wi-Fi routers at the scene. Data volatility means the Wi-Fi router cannot be powered down 
without losing a substantial quantity of data. Third party Wi-Fi enabled devices may connect to or interact with 
the access point after an event occurs. Multiple models exist, with varying internal architectures, operating 
systems, and external interfaces. This paper presents steps and considerations for at scene seizure of Wi-Fi 
devices for law enforcement, to ensure maximum digital forensic evidence is collected. It also lists a series of 
recommendations to the manufacturers of Wi-Fi devices to facilitate a standardised mechanism to collect 
forensic evidence, thus making future acquisitions easier and time efficient.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, the quantity of active Wi-Fi access points found throughout homes and businesses is continually 
increasing, as the technology becomes commonplace in many consumer grade networking and mobile devices 
(Potts, 2014). Internet Service Providers (ISPs) supply customers with Wi-Fi enabled devices as packages 
integrated with broadband contracts. Manufacturers typically enable Wi-Fi on smart phones, laptops and 
computers by default to streamline the configuration and networking process – improving perceived usability. 
The Wi-Fi enabled feature may also remain active purposefully, or unknowingly post-configuration. 
Alternatively, it is common practice for software and firmware upgrades to enable previously disabled Wi-Fi 
functionality on mobile computing devices such as the iPhone (Althuser, 2015). Enabling the Wi-Fi feature on 
smartphones after an update has occurred, streamlines the process of finalising the update process. 
Australia’s use of smart phones, is reaching saturation. Approximately 85% of Australia’s mobile phone owners, 
use a smartphone as their primary mobile phone device (Rogers, 2015). Smartphones are versatile portable 
computing devices with benefits and feature set for all types of consumers. The tablet computer market is 
equally as prevalent. In 2014, approximately 55% of Australian tablet computer owners were accessing the 
Internet through Wi-Fi in contrast to approximately 15% of owners accessing the Internet through a dedicated 
3G/4G network (ACMA, 2014). The widespread use of Wi-Fi technology amongst end-users may result in 
digital evidence of interest being present on Wi-Fi routers, for use in subsequent civil or criminal investigations. 
Obtaining data of interest from Wi-Fi networking devices encompasses a series of challenges. For instance, Wi-
Fi routers cannot be powered off without losing a significant quantity of data stored in volatile memory 
(Szewczyk, 2009).  Subtle variations between Wi-Fi devices and their respective models, may prove problematic 
in attempting to use a standardised approach to extract data of interest (Liu, Chen, Yu & Fu, 2010). Furthermore, 
third party Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. a smartphone) may connect to, or interact with an access point, 
potentially erasing or overwriting previously stored evidentiary data. As a result it is important that first 
responders at the scene are adequately prepared and informed when operating in time critical situations. 
This paper presents a series of empirical experiments and considerations for at scene seizure of Wi-Fi devices to 
ensure maximum digital forensic evidence is preserved and collected by first responders. The paper uses a law 
enforcement perspective in an attempt to identify and propose strategies that could be utilised by first responders 
at the scene. This paper also outlines a series of recommendations focusing towards the manufacturers of Wi-Fi 
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devices that would enable standardised methods to be used to collect evidence of interest, thus making collection 
easier and more time efficient.   
The importance of wireless devices 
Wi-Fi routers have received limited research focus from a digital forensics perspective (Akers, McGrew & 
Dampier, 2011; Minnaard, 2014; Turnbull & Slay, 2008). However those investigations, which have been 
conducted, have discovered that a wealth of information can be gained from networking devices in general (Fu, 
Zhang, Pingley, Yu, Wang & Zhao, 2012; Liu, et al., 2010; Szewczyk, 2011).  A typical consumer grade Wi-Fi 
router has the ability to record and store at a minimum the:  
 Media Access Control (MAC) address of connected devices; 
 Logs of successful or failed authentication attempts; 
 De-authenticated logs; 
 Date and time, typically synced to a Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server; and  
 User generated names of mobile computing devices. 
A Wi-Fi router may also capture probe requests from Wi-Fi enabled mobile devices within the vicinity. Probe 
requests are special periodic requests used to identify what networks are currently active and available. Some 
consumer level Wi-Fi routers have been found to record these requests along with the device’s MAC address 
(Turnbull & Slay, 2008). A MAC address of a device is a significant finding given that no two devices should 
theoretically have the same address (IEEE, 2015). This means that any MAC address that is recorded should be 
unique to that device and that device alone. Further to this, the first three bytes of a MAC address signifies the 
Organisation Unique Identifier (OUI) and allows inquiries to be conducted with the manufacturer to determine 
who purchased it and where the device was sold (Holman, 2012). This could assist in the identification of a 
Person Of Interest (POI). A study by the Australian Institute of Criminology found that of the 479 homicides in 
Australia between 2010-2012, 362 of these, or 75% of the offenders were well known to the victim (AIC, 2015). 
This may suggest the presence, at the time of a criminal act, successful authentication attempts, if the offender 
had been trusted and thus given access credentials to the victims’ Wi-Fi network.  
Mobile computing devices will attempt to automatically reconnect to a previously connected Wi-Fi router when 
within range. Following a successful connection, the router’s logging mechanism may record this connection and 
include the name of the device, the MAC address, the local (IP) address issued and the time/date the device 
authenticated and de-authenticated from the wireless network. For the legal community, to place a device owned 
by an individual at a location at a guaranteed time, may provide a fundamental piece of evidence to a case. As 
many Wi-Fi routers are pre-configured to connect to NTP servers around the world to keep accurate times, this 
automatically reduces the possibility the device could be recording inaccurate dates or times. Whilst some 
challenges exist to prove that a POI had the mobile device on their person at the time, the circumstantial 
evidence, paired with other evidence may lead to a successful prosecution or finding of guilt.  
The names of any device recorded may also offer investigators a line of inquiry, where the offender is unknown. 
In many cases it has been found that owners have named their devices based on their full name or part thereof 
(Könings, 2013). Whilst there have been advances with antennas, power output and attempts to reduce the noise 
surrounding the Wi-Fi network, the majority of consumer level routers provide only local connectivity typically 
for a household’s device (Hamida & Chelius 2010; Fu et al., 2012). Therefore, any connectivity by a POI would 
need to be localised.  
TECHNICAL PROCESSES 
The aim of this study was to obtain a range of consumer level Wi-Fi routers and interrogate those devices to 
determine the quantity and usefulness of data that could be obtained from them by a first responder. Twenty 
consumer grade Wi-Fi routers were used for experimentation. The Wi-Fi routers were biasedly chosen based on 
devices previously seized by Police as part of investigations. This enables an authentic assessment to be 
undertaken based on previously encountered networking devices that would be maintained by end-users. To 
maintain the chain of custody, each device was individually labelled and photographed with its exhibit number. 
Documentation for each device and experiment was maintained. Photographs formed part of the inspection 
process as any damage was recorded along with  accessible ports, internal hardware characteristics and 
model/revision numbers. To minimise anomalies being introduced into the tests due to environmental conditions, 
all experiments were undertaken under the same environmental conditions. Where possible, a faraday room was 
utilised to eliminate further environmental factors. Each device was restored to its factory default setting 
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replicating the typical Wi-Fi router’s state experienced by end-users when installing a router. Table 1 depicts the 
brand, model and device version of the Wi-Fi routers used within this research. 
Table 1 - Wi-Fi routers used for experimentation 
Device # Brand Model Version/Revision 
1 Tompson TL-WR1043ND v1 
2 Netgear WGR614v9 v9 
3 Belkin P10808au v1 
4 TP-Link TL-WR1043ND v1 
5 Linksys WRT54GL v1.1 
6 2-Wire 2071 vA 
7 Belkin F5D8636-4 v1 
8 Thompson TG782T v1 
9 iiNet/Boblite GL411 B 
10 Netgear DG834G v4 
11 Billion 740GE v1 
12 D-Link 604 vA3 
13 Linksys WRT54G v7 
14 iiNet/Belkin F1P1234EGau V1 
15 Cisco AP-1231G-A-K9 v1 
16 Cisco AP-1121G-A-K9 v1 
17 Linksys WAP54G v3 
18 Linksys WRT54G v1 
19 Tp-Link WDR4300 v1 
20 Netgear DGND4000 v1 
Signal and Noise Level Tests 
The purpose of the first test was to isolate the Wi-Fi router from interacting with third party devices. Each 
network device can produce different Wi-Fi signal strengths, thus a controlled test or baseline was firstly 
established. Creating a controlled test provides a mechanism to verify that the changes introduced were not as a 
result of an external factor. Following any change to the device, the results were verified against the control test 
to determine possible differences. A Rohde & Schwartz Spectrum Analyser model ‘FSL’ was utilised to measure 
the power output of each device in decibel megawatts (dBm). The output range for the Wi-Fi routers were 
measured from 0 to -100dBm. The closer the value to zero, the stronger the signal strength.  
As the spectrum analyser samples the environment and cannot distinguish a single individual Wi-Fi router, 
environmental noise was also sampled. Environmental noise simulates a real life situation. Once the testing 
environment was established, each Wi-Fi router was moved further away from the spectrum analyser and the 
signal and noise levels were remeasured. The distances selected for measurements were at 1, 2, 3 and 5 meters.  
The following tests were performed at the aforementioned distances:  
 Remove external antennas (where antennas were present); 
 Remove one and then both antennas (where the device had more than one antenna); 
 Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage using aluminium foil; 
 Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage using aluminium foil with exposed holes; 
 Creating an ad-hoc faraday cage around the antennas using aluminium foil;  
 De-soldering or cutting the antenna connections from the logic board; and 
 De-soldering or cutting internal or external antennas and wrapping the remaining body in 
aluminium foil; 
Log Files 
A series of experiments were conducted to determine how long the log files on the Wi-Fi router were beneficial 
to a forensic investigator before they were deleted by the router’s operating system. This experiment utilised Kali 
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Linux 2.0 and the Aircrack-ng packages (included in the Kali Linux distribution). Some devices provide granular 
log file configuration. Overall, the configuration categorises incidents into one of three events:    
 Administrative events - Administer configuration changes along with power-up and start-up events 
are logged. 
 Firewall events - Blocked incidents, port scans, access attempts from inside the network to sites on 
a block list, logged. 
 Full/Detailed logging - All services including DHCP and wireless access including MAC addresses 
are logged. 
A laptop was utilised to send large quantities of authentication data to the Wi-Fi router. The laptop was 
configured in monitor mode. Monitor mode allows the laptop to capture network traffic, without being 
associated with an access point and therefore announcing its presence. The following command placed the laptop 
into monitor mode:  
# airmon-ng start wlan0 
The mdk3 package was utilised to attack each Wi-Fi router, based on the Wi-Fi’s MAC address of 
44:94:fc:1b:1c:fb. This package utilises an authentication attack (a switch). The –m switch sets the authentication 
attack to use real world MAC addresses:  
# mdk3 wlan0mon a -m  -a 44:94:fc:1b:1c:fb 
With continuous monitoring of the log file of the Wi-Fi router, the log was timed to see how long before it filled 
and rotated. A final test utilised Kali Linux to send DHCPDISCOVER packets to the Wi-Fi router. These 
packets request a local Internet Protocol (IP) address from the Wi-Fi router. Continuous DHCPDISCOVER 
requests were made using the following command:  
# dhcpx -i eth0 
Memory 
Volatile memory will typically contain portions of the log files, as these are written to memory before they are 
written to a file. A series of experiments were conducted to see how long a listing would remain in memory, 
despite the log file being deleted. A connection attempt was made from a laptop with a MAC address 
00:e0:00:a7:24:66 and the log files were checked to ensure this MAC address could be found (Figure 2). 
  
Figure 2 - MAC addresses authenticating 
   
The laptop was connected to the Wi-Fi router using a shell and a capture was completed using the following 
command:  
 
# dd if=/dev/mem of=memory-dump.bin 
This wrote the contents of the Wi-Fi router’s memory to a file called memory-dump.bin. A laptop was then 
utilised to check the file for the last known MAC address:  
# cat memory-dump.bin | grep 00:e0:00:a7:24:66 
On confirmation, the Wi-Fi router was then flooded with as many authentication requests as possible. At each 
30-second interval, the same commands were rerun until the laptop’s MAC address could no longer be found in 
memory.  
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RESULTS 
Throughout this analysis a number of tests were undertaken, ultimately with the aim of gaining access to the Wi-
Fi router to preserve the logs and volatile memory. Further tests were conducted to determine the lifespan of the 
log files, and therefore the criticality to have an investigator attend a scene to ensure they were preserved. 
Overall, it was found once the device lost power, the log files were deleted. The configuration files were not 
however affected by the loss of power, and could have potential evidentiary value.  
Table 2 - Characteristics of Wi-Fi routers tested 
Device 
number 
Non Volatile 
RAM  
Volatile 
RAM 
Shell 
available 
Shell 
accessible  
On-board 
connectors 
Logging enabled 
(Admin/Firewall/ 
Full) 
1 8Mb 128Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
2 2Mb 8Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
3 2Mb 256Mb No No Yes Admin 
5 8Mb 32Mb Yes Yes Yes Full 
6 4Mb 128Mb Yes No No Admin 
7 128Mb 256Mb No No Yes Admin 
8 8Mb 32Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
9 64Mb 256Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
10 16Mb 512Mb Yes No Yes Firewall 
11 4Mb 4Mb No No Yes Firewall 
12 2Mb 8Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
13 2Mb 16Mb Yes No Yes Firewall 
14 4Mb 8Mb Yes Yes Yes Admin 
15 8Mb 16Mb Yes No No Firewall 
16 8Mb 32Mb Yes No No Admin 
17 8Mb 128Mb Yes No Yes Admin 
18 4Mb 8Mb Yes Yes Yes Full 
19 4Mb 16Mb Yes Yes Yes Full 
20 8Mb 128Mb Yes Yes No Full 
 
Logging 
Sixteen of the twenty devices inspected had little or no logging enabled by default, despite having the capability 
to log more extensive information. The devices which did log events, only stored administrative functions, such 
as logins, and power up events. It is unclear if the manufacturer reduced the logging functionality to minimise 
the required space on the device. Four of the twenty devices had logging enabled to a sufficient level that it 
would capture Domain Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) assignments (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3- DHCP assignments for the Netgear DGND4000 “webgenie” interface 
No devices had default logging capabilities to capture beacon/probe request packets and no devices had logging 
enabled to capture Wi-Fi authentication packets, despite this logging feature being available. During 
experimentation with a TP-Link TL-WDR4300, it was found that a brute force authentication attack using real 
world MAC addresses caused the log file to rotate within 14 minutes and 50 seconds. Conducting the same 
experiment, slowing the authentication attack to one attempt per second caused the log file to rotate after 26 
minutes. Further experiments on a Linksys WRTG54G, which had approximately 8Mb of non-volatile RAM, 
found the device only allowed 204Kb of log files before rotating the log file. This 204Kb equated to 
approximately 1582 lines of data.  
Further tests, using DHCPDISCOVER packets to request an IP address from a Netgear DGND4000, showed that 
the webpage log file contained a maximum of 261 lines of information. One packet request was sent per second 
[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.8)] to MAC address 90:B9:31:4A:FF:46 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:59:57         
[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.16)] to MAC address 90:B9:31:CA:65:C1 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:47:52 
[DHCP IP: (192.168.0.12)] to MAC address 00:16:CB:B7:2E:92 Tuesday, October 06,2015 07:39:18         
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and despite some of these packets being ignored, the log file filled in 7 minutes and 31seconds. Once the log file 
had been rotated in both scenarios, the old log files were erased and no longer accessible on the device.  
Antennas and Signal Strength 
The devices investigated were found to have either an external or internal antenna (or a combination of both). 
For the first responding forensic investigator, this highlights the importance of properly inspecting the device 
internally and externally, without making assumptions that the external antenna is the only point for Wi-Fi 
transmission (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 - F Antenna as found on a Thompson Bigpond TG782T device 
Immediately after disconnecting the external antenna on the Thompson TG782T Wi-Fi router, it switched to the 
internal F antenna, thus preserving signal strength. Several Wi-Fi routers had similar antenna arrangements. 
Many Wi-Fi routers allow their external antennas to be removed. Removing any number of these antennas 
significantly reduces the ability for the router to provide an effective signal; however leaving any number of 
antennas still connected allowed the router to still transmit data effectively. Where a device had an internal 
aerial, which had been soldered directly to the circuit board, these antennas were either de-soldered from the 
circuit board or their shielded cable was cut (Figure 4). If the cable was cleanly cut and the wire was shielded, 
the device had no ability to transmit or receive data and was thus the Wi-Fi was deemed isolated.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Internal aerial as found on the iiNet Boblite GL411 device 
 
A number of subject devices were tested using aluminium foil to block Wi-Fi data transmission. In all cases 
where aluminium foil was utilised to cover the entire device, the device was unable to communicate effectively. 
In cases where there was an opening in the aluminium foil, irrespective of where the opening was located, radio 
frequencies were able to leak beyond the confines of the aluminium foil (Figure 6). Similar risks could result 
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with the use of faraday bags, particularly in cases where the device needs to be kept powered. This is an 
important facet for a first responder to consider to minimise the contamination of evidence on the Wi-Fi router. 
 
 
Figure 6 - TP-Link TL-WR1043ND covered in aluminium foil with large opening at the front 
Memory  
A brute force Wi-Fi authentication attack on a TP-Link WR1043ND, demonstrated that within 8 minutes the 
memory had been overwritten. During this time approximately 91,000 attempted connections were made. It was 
also found that the log files had been rotated. This meant that all history associated with a specific connection, 
prior to the attack, no longer resided in either the log files or the memory of the device. A subsequent 
authentication attack, limiting the authentication attacks to one attack per second, found that while the log files 
had been rotated, the memory still retained details after the 3 hour period of testing. 
Additional tests within a busy office environment, in which the device had extensive network traffic, found the 
device typically only retained data for a maximum of 12 hours. After this period the chance of extracting a MAC 
address authentication request was minimal. These results suggest memory usage is extremely dependent on:  
 The amount of traffic traversing the network; 
 The number of authentication attempts; and 
 The amount of free or available memory on the device. 
Access Issues 
For the majority of consumer grade Wi-Fi routers the ability to gain access via terminal or a shell has been 
removed as manufacturers have set an administration password, which is unknown and not included with 
product  literature. In some Wi-Fi routers it was found the device allowed users shell access and then a firmware 
update later precluded this access (Turnbull & Slay, 2008). In the absence of a shell or terminal, ram captures are 
inhibited and detailed log analysis is reduced. The ability to connect to the Wi-Fi router’s administration web 
interface is made difficult without the correct authentication credentials. However in some cases, the default 
administration details were found on the underside of the modem (Figure 7).  
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 Figure 7 - Thomson branded ST585v6 Wi-Fi Modem sticker from underside 
 
During inspection of the logic boards, some Wi-Fi routers had possible JTAG and serial port connections. These 
connections could potentially allow access via a console or a direct download. Typically these connections 
mitigate the need for access credentials. Ensuring the Wi-Fi router is powered on whilst removing the external 
casing to establish suitable connection points is challenging. Many of the pin configurations were unlabelled, 
and thus further analysis and research would be required, along with a suitable live-capture procedure. 
In the absence of on board connections, the only remaining forensic process would be that of chip-off forensics. 
This technique involves the physical removal, using heat, to de-solder the microchip from the circuit board. Once 
removed, the microchip can then be connected to a NAND flash reader and its data subsequently interpreted. 
Typically this style of forensic exploration causes physical destruction to the device with the potential to negate 
the integrity of data and future operation of the Wi-Fi router. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Detailed Notes   
During forensic investigations it is imperative that the investigator maintains detailed contemporaneous notes 
throughout the task. These notes should be similar to that of a police running sheet so the results can be utilised 
as evidence in court. The notes should also include the goals which were to be attempted, the actions towards 
reaching those goals, any critical decisions which were made at the time, the outcome – success or failure and 
the reasons why. Detailed notes are further critical in investigating Wi-Fi routers in that the process utilised may 
not necessarily work successfully on similar devices. This is an unfortunate factor associated with vendors 
revising and altering the hardware and software of each device, which is identified through associated revision 
numbers (i.e. A5). 
Isolating and Seizing Devices 
Wi-Fi routers can be sensitive and susceptible to forensic contamination, particularly if they are listening and 
logging beacon packets or possible authentication attempts. Once a crime scene has been declared, any Wi-Fi 
transmitting or receiving devices should be strictly quarantined from the area of concern. The Wi-Fi router 
should be kept powered up and isolated, with network connections disconnected. External antennas should be 
removed and the device should be preferably placed in a sealed faraday bag. However if one is not available to 
the first responder, it should at least be entirely covered in aluminium foil (with no holes present) to suppress any 
radio frequencies. In all cases where a live forensic acquisition is to be completed, the Wi-Fi router will need to 
be transported whilst powered on or evidence extracted at the scene.  
Database of Devices  
 
It is recommended that further research is undertaken to build a central database documenting Wi-Fi router 
specifications and characteristics. Once implemented, forensic investigators who have access to the database 
would benefit by accessing a quick point of reference, and increasing their knowledge of devices and evidence 
that may be afforded. The proposed database structure could use the following components:  
1 Wi-Fi router table detailing the:  
 Device model number; 
 Hardware version ; 
 Photograph(s) of the device; and 
 Other specific device information. 
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The Wi-Fi table shows the physical device based on what can be read on it’s labels and viewed in photographs.   
2 A  one-to-one relationship, star rating table.  
 An indication of how forensically beneficial interrogating the device would be; and 
 A explanation of the associated rating. 
The star-rating table gives an overall rating of the ability for an examiner to collect data from the device. A 
single star rating may indicate a poor indicator whilst a high star rating could indicate shell access with the 
ability to download memory in a forensically sound manner. This information would benefit the first responder 
in adequately preparing for the at scene investigation. 
3 A many-to-one relationship, hardware version table detailing:  
 A hardware and firmware version of a device logic board; 
 The number of serial ports on the device; 
 The number of internal and external aerials; and 
 Possible other hardware specific information; 
The hardware version table records the differences between multiple software versions. Additionally it records 
the differences in the internal, component level designs of multiple devices. 
4 A JTAG and serial access table 
 Detail circuit board pin outs; and  
 Configuration (including photographs to facilitate the process). 
The JTAG/Serial Table addresses interfacing issues with the hardware of different devices.   
5 A Firmware version table linked to the hardware version detailing: 
 Versions of firmware; 
 Default authentication credentials; and  
 Known access credentials from manufactures.  
A firmware version table would address the software differences along with the access credentials for those 
firmware versions.  
6 An exploitability-rating table:  
 A rating for the possible security/exploitation of the device; and  
 An explanation of the metric for the rating. 
The intention for this table is to demonstrate how exploitable the device firmware or hardware is for gaining 
access to the device. Should a device be more exploitable a higher rating maybe provider, a lower rating might 
demonstrate a device which is more secure. 
7 A vulnerability assessment table with examples of successful vulnerabilities; 
This table holds vulnerabilities and how they might relate to a device.     
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 Figure 8: The proposed conceptual diagram of the database required 
Standards   
Despite the limited number of devices examined during this research, it was found that the multitude of Wi-Fi 
routers function differently from one another. Manufacturers regularly change the devices between firmware and 
hardware versions to suit their needs, and are typically motivated by financial reasons (Constantin, 2014). 
Manufacturing standards for Wi-Fi devices would be beneficial for subsequent law enforcement based 
investigations. Establishing these standards in Australia would provide several advantages:  
 The device’s data of interest could be extracted more accurately; 
 The manner of obtaining data of interest would be simplified; and 
 Training of forensic investigators would be simplified;  
For these standards to be accepted by consumers, they need a simple way to recognise the Wi-Fi router they are 
about to purchase is both:  
 A secure device for their day-to-day internet activities, produced by a legitimate Australian 
authorised identity; and 
 A device that law enforcement agents can if required gain access to with minimal disruption.  
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 A possible law enforcement tick of approval, or symbol, is a suitable example. This symbol can be placed on the 
packaging of manufactured products to educate consumers of the benefits of purchasing this device over another, 
which features no approval. For manufacturers to obtain this tick, they will need to conform to a series of 
requirements. Similar outlines have been presented to the manufacturers and customers purchasing CCTV 
systems (ANZPAA, 2014). For Wi-Fi devices, the most obvious need is a mechanism to connect and download 
the data of interest applicable to the device.  
CONCLUSION 
 
The Wi-Fi router could contain a critical piece of evidence for a forensic investigator. The ability to place an 
offender at a specific time and place, based on capturing their mobile device information, could lead to either a 
successful prosecution or plead of guilt. 
However, as demonstrated through this research paper, multiple issues exist for extracting data of interest. The 
data capture is potentially costly, due to the differences in hardware, software and lack of standardisation 
amongst devices. In addition this capture typically needs to be completed at a scene, with the device remaining 
powered up. Due to these costs, further research is required before a comprehensive framework can be 
developed and put into the public domain to support first responders. A detailed database of Wi-Fi router 
specifications and characteristics could be used within the courts and legal practices of Australia.  
Future research will focus on the development of an open accessed detailed database encompassing a range of 
Wi-Fi routers available in Australia. It is anticipated that the sharing of knowledge by various communities will 
facilitate the streamlined process of data extraction from Wi-Fi routers. Ultimately this further research of Wi-Fi 
routers and the potential evidence to law enforcement and Australian courts will assist making the community a 
safer place.  
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